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The Liberty of Participation in Online
Alternative Dispute Resolution Schemes
Haitham A. Haloush* & Bashar H. Malkawi**
ABSTRACT
Electronic commerce is important, and perhaps, inevitable. Thus, to
consider the legal implications of the growth and development of electronic
commerce is essential. However, the lack of suitable dispute resolution
mechanisms in cyberspace will constitute a serious obstacle to the further
development of electronic commerce. Accordingly, this paper argues that
when Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), particularly arbitration and me-
diation, move to cyberspace, the form of Online Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion (OADR) can maximize the growth of e-commerce.
I. INTRODUCTION
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and the Internet are two very
topical issues. Online Alternative Dispute Resolution (OADR), or ADR on-
line, refers to the use of Internet technology, wholly or partially, as a medium
by which to conduct the proceedings of ADR in order to resolve commercial
disputes that arise from Internet use. Neutral private bodies operate the pro-
ceedings under published rules of procedure.
It is important to address mandatory OADR, which means that the par-
ties are bound to adhere to the OADR process. Indeed, it is imperative to
display what risks Internet users should be willing to take with mandatory
OADR schemes. This paper concludes that the issue of consent should be at
the forefront of any contemplated OADR solution. Clearly, it is unacceptable
to impose mandatory OADR on Internet users without their knowledge and
consent. Instead, a complainant who wishes to avoid the mandatory nature
of an OADR proceeding must be able to bring the action in any court that has
jurisdiction over the dispute. Bearing this in mind, there is strong reason to
believe that mandatory OADR schemes would not be enforceable in courts,
and that the entire scheme of mandatory OADR might be unworkable.
In the online world, OADR should not be presented as a superior alter-
native to the court system, which would render the old court system obsolete.
Additionally, OADR must not be conceived as the main force driving
changes in dispute settlement in cyberspace. Instead, OADR must be con-
* Haitham Haloush is Assistant Professor of Commercial Law at the Hashemite
University, Jordan. He holds a PhD in commercial law from Leeds University,
England, College of Law, and an L.L.M. from Aberdeen University, Scotland,
College of Law. I would like to thank Professor Clive Walker for his helpful
comments and research assistance.
** Bashar H. Malkawi is Assistant Professor of Law at the Hashemite University,
Jordan. The author holds LL.B, Yarmouk University in 1999 an LL.M, Univer-
sity of Arizona College of Law in 2001 and a S.J.D, American University,
Washington D.C in 2005.
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
ceived as merely a stream contributing to the broad river of change in how
dispute resolution can be managed in cyberspace. OADR is a substitute for
other methods of dispute resolution; it is one option available to Internet
users. Indeed, the idea of OADR is not simply about the use of technology to
resolve disputes in cyberspace, it is rather about improving choice among
other dispute resolution alternatives.
In advancing this issue, this paper will analyze the liberty of participa-
tion in ADR. Then it will proceed to address the liberty of participation in
OADR schemes. After that, the paper will address the ICANN policy of
using mandatory OADR procedures to resolve disputes concerning General
Top Level Domain Names. Next, it will analyze the disparity of bargaining
power between consumers and merchants, with implications on consumers'
consent to mandatory schemes in OADR. Finally, the paper summarizes its
findings and relates the findings to one another in a coherent way which
might help in the future development of OADR.
It must be noted that there will be special references to the implications
of OADR upon English litigation. Such implications must be analyzed be-
cause they constitute a reference point for the assessment of the quality of
justice of a given OADR provider, and they provide a framework for reflect-
ing upon the general requirements of fair process in OADR. As a result, the
priority in this research is towards the implications of OADR on the United
Kingdom and English litigation. The default is English law, where it is well
developed, appropriate, and constructive. The United Kingdom government
is enthusiastic about developing the potential for electronic transactions,
partly as a method of delivering government services, and partly as the basis
for promoting competition and economic growth. It appears that there is now
a strong political imperative in the U.K. to prompt various actions that will
create trust, reliance, and confidence in doing business over the Internet. The
U.K. leaders strives to make their country the best place in the world for e-
commerce. 1
For the purpose of this paper, Business to Consumer (B-to-C) Internet
transaction disputes and Internet trademark infringement disputes in the form
of domain name disputes will be deployed as two case studies. B-to-C and
domain name dispute resolution have been a major area of activity for
OADR because of the need to build e-commerce through increasing Internet
users' confidence. On the one hand, the domain name system is an indispen-
sable element for e-commerce to work properly. E-commerce is a source of
growing demand on domain names because currently there is no effective
alternative method of finding a company's Internet location. Accordingly, the
utility of the Domain Name System (DNS) should be understood primarily
within the broader context of e-commerce and conducting business on the
Internet. Due to the nature of the Internet, the domain name is as important as
1. For a full account on the U.K. government's strategy in relation to the encour-
agement of e-commerce, see Office of the e-Envoy, http://archive.cabinetoffice.
gov.uk/e-envoy/index-content.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2007).
[Vol. XI
The Liberty of Participation
the business itself, or more precisely, the domain name is one of the com-
pany's primary assets. For the consumer, a domain name allows access to the
Internet, provides a direct link to the online business, and provides a mode of
initiating transactions online. For the business, acquisition of a domain name
is considered as a prerequisite to conducting business online. As a result,
firms and others increasingly seek to have an Internet presence, because
without a domain name, a company would be practically invisible on the
Internet; customers would not know where to find the company. 2 On the
other hand, given that a B-to-C Internet transaction typically represents the
sale of goods and services from business entities to individuals, uncertainty
over the legal framework of B-to-C Internet transaction disputes may inhibit
both consumers from purchasing products or services over the Internet, and
companies from entering into the electronic marketplace.3
II. THE LIBERTY OF PARTICIPATION IN ADR
It is important to draw the line between the concepts of binding OADR
(which binds the parties to the outcome of the OADR procedures) and
mandatory OADR (where the parties are bound to adhere to the OADR pro-
cess). The former concept is beyond the limits of this paper. This paper will
address the latter concept in order to display which risks Internet users
should be willing to take with mandatory OADR schemes.
The relationship between ADR and the judicial system is very important
because ADR schemes should not prejudice or undermine any other means of
judicial redress.4 Moreover, although ADR can provide appropriate solutions
for many disputes, it must be recognized that even in the most ideal world, a
certain number of disputes would still end up in courts. ADR is inappropriate
for adjudicating some cases, and it may not always be in the best interest of
all parties to participate in ADR. For example, under certain circumstances, a
class action lawsuit may provide a more effective form of relief than the
individual arbitral system. Certain harms inflicted on Internet users may be
small yet widespread, making it impractical to pursue certain claims unless
brought as a class action.
Furthermore, competition between in-court and out-of-court dispute set-
tlement should not be exaggerated. One facet of this exaggeration is the sug-
gestion that the rule of law is in jeopardy when parties resolve their dispute
2. Dan L. Burk, Trademarks along the lnfobahn: A First Look at the Emerging
Law of Cybermarks, 1 RIcH. J.L. & TECH. 1, *9 (1995).
3. Pankaj Ghemawat, Distance Still Matters: The Hard Reality of Global Expan-
sion, 79 HARv. Bus. REV. 137, 143 (2001).
4. See Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report (1996), http://www.dca.gov.
uk/civil/final/contents.htm (last visited May 21, 2008) (providing an intensive
discussion on the legal implications of ADR).
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outside of the court.5 In this regard, Harry Edward, a leading author on
ADR, has said, "[w]e must determine whether ADR will result in an aban-
donment of our constitutional system in which the rule of law is created and
principally enforced by legitimate branches of government."6 Edward's
opinion is unwise, to say the least, because it is based on a sharp division
between the court system and ADR. Such a division is unwarranted because
non-binding ADR methods are merely alternatives to legalistic methods of
dispute resolution. These alternative mechanisms are not intended to supplant
court adjudication, but rather to supplement it. They can operate effectively
in conjunction with or in the shadow of the court system. Since non-binding
ADR cannot bring together unwilling parties to settle their differences, it
does not have the power to enforce the outcome of ADR proceeding, as the
courts do.
Clearly, participation in ADR does not mean waiving the rights to re-
course provided by ordinary law; rather, participation in ADR serves as a
general renunciation of the remedies available in law. In this regard, Profes-
sor Roy Goode argues that it is difficult to evaluate the advantages of ADR
over other dispute resolution mechanisms, including courts, because various
legal options compete with each other in a rather unclear way.7 Professor
Goode concludes that no system has any innate superiority over another.8
Courts are increasingly using ADR mechanisms to settle disputes.9 The
fact that courts provide a formal dispute resolution mechanism does not rule
out the development of links between them and the techniques of ADR. This
suggests that an extra-judicial component could be grafted on to civil pro-
ceedings because many view ADR as an innovative way to improve adjudi-
cation procedures, providing an alternative avenue of justice for both the
defendant and the plaintiff.o
One of the main incentives for parties to participate in ADR schemes is
that alternative forms of dispute settlement emphasize the advantages of the
flexible and speedy nature of their procedure rather than requiring a formal
5. World Intellectual Prop. Org., The Management of Internet Domain Names and
Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues: Final Report of the WIPO Internet Do-
main Name Process, 46 (Apr. 30, 1999), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/
www/amc/en/docs/report-final 1.pdf (last visited on May 21, 2008) [hereinafter
WIPO].
6. Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema, 99
HARV. L. REv., 668, 671 (1986).
7. Roy Goode, COMMERCIAL LAW 1177 (2d ed., Penguin Books 1995).
8. Id.
9. See Jean R. Stemlight, Separate and Not Equal: Integrating Civil Procedure
and ADR In Legal Academia, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 681, 690-91 (2005).
10. See Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, A Glass Half Empty: The Use of
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L.
REv. 1587, 1591-1597 (1995).
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adaptation of established legal procedure." In fact, various countries have
introduced pilot schemes whereby courts refer the parties to alternative dis-
pute resolution mechanisms.' 2 The growing use of ADR often is associated
with the explicit annexation of ADR procedures by well-known court sys-
tems, as in the case of court-annexed arbitration.13
In Aktien Gesellschaft v. Fortuna Co., the court stated that arbitration
and the court system ought to be regarded as coordinate rather than rival. 14
The introduction of the English Arbitration Act of 1996 strengthened this
position in England, implying that commercial arbitration should be comple-
mentary to, and not in competition with, the court system.15
III. THE LIBERTY OF PARTICIPATION IN OADR SCHEMES
The idea of OADR is not simply about the use of technology to resolve
disputes in cyberspace; rather, it is about improving choice among other al-
ternatives.16 OADR and legal redress are two separate issues. Access to the
latter should not be conditional on the exhaustion, or even the use, of the
possibilities offered by the former. Restricted access would seriously under-
mine Internet users' confidence in OADR solutions because an effective
OADR scheme should not be compulsory. Any comprehensive alternative to
the courts should not exist in any contemplated OADR scheme. Instead, the
notion of OADR should be that Internet users have certain courthouse rights,
but those courthouse rights may not be meaningful in small monetary
amounts or on an international level. Although Internet users may not invoke
their courthouse rights, the fact that they could invoke them is important. In
practical terms, Internet disputes will probably not reach courts, but users
should have this theoretical assurance of the court.
11. See Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons From the Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 424-25 (1986).
12. Antione Cremona, Analyzing Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Mecha-
nisms In Europe and EU Activity in The Field: The Communitarisation of Pri-
vate Justice 10-14 (Peter G. Xuerab ed., Malta University Studies Association)
(2006), available at http://home.um.edu.mt/edrc/jmps-adr.PDF (discussing the
ADR schemes in Germany, The United Kingdom, and Luxemborg).
13. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR:
A Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Court Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
2169, 2172 (1993).
14. Aktien Gesellschaft v. Fortuna Co., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 497, 503 (1999).
15. See Arbitration Act (1996), http://www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts/actsl996/plain/ukpga
_19960023en (last visited May 21, 2008).
16. Melissa Conley Tyler and Di Bretherton, CourRY EXPERIENCES OF ODR:
AUSTRALIA, Research into Online Alternative Dispute Resolution, an Explora-
tion Report Prepared for the Department of Justice, Victoria, Australia, 3-4
(2003), http://www.odr.info/unece2003/pdf/tylerl.pdf (last visited May 15,
2008).
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The letter "A" in OADR normally stands for "alternative." It may be
useful, however, to replace "alternative" with the term "appropriate." If
OADR is an appropriate dispute resolution mechanism in cyberspace, it does
not mean that the use of OADR for immediate resolution in cyberspace
should preclude other forms of dispute resolution. Internet users who submit
disputes to the OADR system should not have to waive their legal rights, nor
should they be restricted or blocked from resorting to other avenues of re-
course. Thus, the basic role of the judicial process as a method of settling
disputes must be reaffirmed.17
The goal of the OADR process is not to create new rights or to accord
greater protection to parties' rights in cyberspace than that which exists else-
where. Rather, the goal is to give proper and adequate expression of parties'
existing rights in the context of the Internet. OADR should not be viewed as
a way to create a parallel universe for online disputes in which Internet users
no longer have the rights and protection afforded to them by the legal frame-
work in their home countries.
Access to courts to settle any type of dispute is a basic right to which the
idea of mandatory OADR schemes is repugnant. If mandatory OADR be-
comes standard for Internet disputes, Internet users will know that their rem-
edies are limited; thus, they will more reluctantly engage in e-commerce.
Indeed, the representation of OADR as the superior alternative to the court
system is dangerous. OADR should remain a voluntary, rather than
mandatory, dispute resolution mechanism in cyberspace.
Among the EU recommendations on the principles applicable to the
bodies responsible for out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes, the prin-
ciple of legality dictates that ADR bodies, while retaining the flexibility of
their procedures, should apply the mandatory laws that courts would other-
wise have to apply.18 Accordingly, it is unacceptable for an ADR body to
resolve a dispute in a manner diametrically opposed to the decision that a
court would have made in the same case.19 Clearly, the principle of legality
in the EU recommendations could be seriously endangered in mandatory
OADR schemes. The principle of legality attempts to ensure that the dispu-
tant has knowingly and freely elected to abide by the mechanism's outcome.
The principle of legality in the recommendations has been expressed as
follows:
The decision taken by the body may not result in the consumer
being deprived of the protection afforded by the mandatory provi-
17. WIPO, supra note 5, at 49.
18. Commission of the European Communities, Commission Recommendations on
the Principles Applicable to the Bodies Responsible for Out-of-Court Settle-
ment of Consumer Disputes, 20-21 (1998), http://aei.pitt.edu/1 179/01/consumer
_justice.gpfollowCOM_1998_198.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2007) [hereinafter
Commission of the European Communities].
19. See id.
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sions of the law of the state in whose territory the body is estab-
lished. In the case of cross-border disputes, the decision taken by
the body may not result in the consumer being deprived of the
protection afforded by the mandatory provisions applying under
the law of the member state in which he is normally resident in the
instances provided for under Article 5 of the Rome Convention of
19 June 1980 on the law applicable to contractual obligations.20
In this regard, it seems appropriate to recall the opinion of Ian Macneil, one
of the leading authors on arbitration law. He argues that only court litigation
can be commenced unilaterally.21 Arbitration and other forms of ADR are
available only if the parties at some stage agree that the dispute will be re-
solved by a third-party neutral.22 Without fully informed and voluntary con-
sent, arbitration and other forms of ADR lose all credibility as a just
alternative to litigation. Along this line, Macneil has said:
Using terms such as compulsory or mandatory in such circum-
stances is, at best, highly confusing. At worst, it constitutes ques-
tion begging; the very question at stake where such questions arise
is whether whatever consent to arbitrate as has been manifested
should or should not be given full contractual effect. To call arbi-
tration compulsory or mandatory is to answer by label, not by at-
tention to the facts and by analysis.23
Given that ADR is generally characterized by the predominance of a consen-
sual approach and freedom of contract, OADR should be based on voluntary
participation, and therefore not deprive the parties of their access to the
courts. From this perspective, restricting the options of disputants to only
OADR, and denying access to the courts should not be permitted. As a re-
sult, an important task would be to design an OADR system in a way that has
the potential to establish an appropriate linkage to the court system, but with-
out harming the flexibility of the ADR process. Accordingly, it becomes
clear that there should be a balance in cyberspace between the preservation
of the long-tried right to seek redress through courts and the processes of
ADR, which are rooted in well-established procedures.24
20. Id.
21. See Ian R. Macneil, Richard E. Speidel & Thomas J. Stipanowich, FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FED-
ERAL ARBITRATION ACT, 17-18 (Little Brown 1994).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. WIPO, supra note 5, at 46.
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IV. THE ICANN POLICY IN USING MANDATORY OADR PROCEDURES
TO RESOLVE DISPUTES CONCERNING GTLDs
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN),
which is the non-profit corporation responsible for Internet Protocol address
(IP) space allocation, receives its authority over domain names from a U.S.
Department of Commerce contract to administer the root of the system (i.e.,
the ultimate database in which all Top-Level Domains (TLDs) are regis-
tered).25 The ICANN Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
(UDRP) is incorporated as a part of the Generic Top-Level Domain Names'
(gTLDs) registration agreement, which includes .com, .org and .net.26 The
UDRP is imposed by contract upon all of the accredited gTLDs registrars
and, in turn, the registrars impose it upon domain name holders as a condi-
tion of the registration agreement. 27
At present, the ICANN policy uses mandatory OADR procedures to re-
solve disputes concerning gTLDs such as .com, .net and .org. 28 In order to
register a domain name in any of the gTLDs, an applicant must agree to be
bound by UDRP, which utilizes OADR mechanisms.29 Consequently, every
registrant has agreed to be subject to a mandatory administrative proceeding
when someone else alleges that the domain name is identical or confusingly
similar to a registered trademark, the registrant has no legitimate interest in
the domain name, and the domain name has been registered and used in bad
faith.30 In this regard, Article 4(a) reads as follows:
You are required to submit to a mandatory administrative pro-
ceeding in the event that a third party (a "complainant") asserts to
the applicable Provider, in compliance with the Rules of Proce-
dure, that (i) your domain name is identical or confusingly similar
to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has
25. United States Department of Commerce Executes Contract for Technical Man-
agement of the Internet with ICANN, Aug. 15, 2006, available at http://www.
icann.org/en/announcements/announcement- 15aug06.htm.
26. ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) (Oct. 24,
1999), http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last visited May 19, 2008)
[hereinafter ICANN, UDRP].
27. Id. Before ICANN, in 1993, after a gradual increase in commercial Internet
activity, the National Science Foundation (NSF) subcontracted the job of regis-
tering domain names to a small company named "Network Solutions." Net-
work Solutions registered domain names on a first-come, first-served basis, just
as all the Internet domain names had always been allocated. For an intensive
discussion on this issue see D. Howitt, War.com: Why the Battle Over Domain
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rights; and (ii) you have no rights or legitimate interests in respect
of the domain name; and (iii) your domain name has been regis-
tered and is being used in bad faith. In the administrative proceed-
ing, the complainant must prove that each of these three elements
is present.31
ICANN argued that persons who register domain names in bad faith and
abuse the intellectual property rights of others would be unlikely to choose to
submit to a procedure that is cheaper and faster than litigation, like UDRP.32
The argument put forth in defense of the mandatory nature of the UDRP
is flawed in three ways. First, by confining the scope of the procedures of
UDRP to abusive registrations, the danger of innocent domain name holders
(i.e., those acting in good faith) being required to participate in the procedure
is not eliminated. There are non-trademarked, legitimate uses of words,
names and symbols. Therefore, one must not lose sight of traditional non-
commercial Internet uses. 33
Second, UDRP is unfair because its application favors trademark own-
ers. As a result, many have criticized the UDRP and called to revise it on the
basis that it reinforces a bias toward large commercial interests (i.e., interests
that already have trademarks in registered form).34 Third, the UDRP does not
properly address the selection mechanism of the dispute resolution service
provider. A single party should not be allowed to choose the third-party neu-
tral. Article 6(b) reads as follows:
If neither the Complainant nor the Respondent has elected a three-
member Panel (Paragraph 3 (b)(iv) and 5(b)(iv)), the Provider
shall appoint, within five calendar days following receipt of the
response by the Provider, or the lapse of the time period for the
submission thereof, a single Panelist from its list of panelists.35
Statistical evidence suggests that a vague selection mechanism of the
third-party neutral leads to forum shopping, which biases the results.36 A
party accomplishes forum shopping by rationally selecting an OADR pro-
31. Id.
32. WIPO, supra note 5, at (vi).
33. G. Peter Albert, Jr., Right on the Mark: Defining the Nexus Between Trade-
marks and Internet Domain Names, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
277, 294 (1997).
34. Ethan Katsh & Janet Rifkin, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: RESOLVING CON-
FLICTS IN CYBERSPACE, 64-65 (Jossey-Bass 2001). See also Marcelo Halpern
& Ajay K. Mehrota, From International Treaties to Internet Norms: The
Evolution of International Trademark Disputes in the Internet Age, 21 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 523, 556-58 (2000).
35. ICANN, UDRP, supra note 24.
36. Katsh & Rifldn, supra note 32, at 111.
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vider who tends to rule in favor of the party selecting the provider or the
party with the highest bargaining power. Statistics show that the two OADR
providers who obtain the most cases, WIPO Online Dispute Resolution Cen-
tre and the National Arbitration Forum, are more likely to decide in favor of
the claimant.37 The claimants win 82.2 percent of the time with WIPO Online
Dispute Resolution Centre and 82.9 percent of the time with the National
Arbitration Forum.38 Despite this evidence, the argument against mandatory
OADR schemes must be viewed in a wider context than ICANN policy. As
explained below, there is a disparity of bargaining power between consumers
and merchants. This would have apparent implications on consumers' con-
sent to mandatory schemes in OADR.
V. THE IMPACT OF BARGAINING POWER DISPARITY ON MANDATORY
OADR SCHEMES
In areas such as consumer protection, national laws may affect parties'
interests irrespective of any choice the parties have made. Often, laws relat-
ing to consumer protection will strike out or restrict choice of law and dis-
pute settlement clauses, rendering them wholly or partially ineffective.39
Such laws are reasonable because there is often a disparity in bargaining
power between consumers and merchants in consumer transactions. The dis-
parity of bargaining power between consumers and merchants has led legis-
lators to prescribe special terms for consumer contracts.40 For example,
Article 5 of the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations reads as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3 [providing that a con-
tract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties], a choice
of law made by the parties shall not have the result of depriving
the consumer of the protection afforded him by the mandatory
rules of the law of the country in which he has his habitual
residence.41
Contract clauses relating to dispute resolution often reflect the disparity of
bargaining power between consumers and merchants. Such clauses fre-
quently provide for disputes to be settled exclusively out of court. In other
words, a consumer has no right to bring a complaint before the court. In this
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See John Adams, Digital Age Standard Form Contracts Under Australian Law:
"Wrap" Agreements, Exclusive Jurisdiction, and Binding Arbitration Clauses,
13 PAC. RiM L. & POL'Y J. 503, 537-41 (2004) (discussing cases in which
courts found arbitration clauses invalid).
40. Veijo Heiskanen, Dispute Resolution in International Electronic Commerce, 16
J. INT'L ARB. 29, 31 (1999).
41. Council Convention 80/934, art. 5, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1, 3 (EC).
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regard, the EU "Recommendations on Principles Applicable to the Bodies
Responsible for Out-of-Court Settlement of Consumer Disputes" strongly
suggest that there are legal limits on the ability of any ADR system to fore-
close access to the court system by consumers.42 The Recommendations state
that "[u]se of the out-of-court alternative may not deprive consumers of their
right to bring the matter before the courts unless they expressly agree to do
so, in full awareness of the facts and only after the dispute has
materialized."43
Similarly, Article 3 of the European Council Directive on Unfair Terms
in Consumer Contracts expressly limits the effectiveness of terms that busi-
nesses have pre-established, which hinder a consumer's right to take legal
action.44 Article 3 (together with the annex) declares that a contract term is
unfair if it:
[E]xclude[s] or hinder[s] the consumer's right to take legal action
or exercise any other legal remedy, particularly by requiring the
consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered
by legal provisions, unduly restricting the evidence available to
him or imposing on him a burden of proof which, according to the
applicable law, should lie with another party to the contract. 45
In essence, Article 3 of the Directive states that by leaving the choice of
dispute settlement mechanism with the consumer, businesses can avoid the
risk of having an unfair term in their consumer contracts. 46
Arguably, mandatory arbitration clauses are designed to give businesses
significant advantages in their disputes with consumers.47 Merchants may
know the arbitrators overseeing the dispute and be more familiar with the
arbitration process than the average consumer.48 For example, they may have
a record or other source of information regarding an arbitrator's past deci-
sions.49 Because a consumer is unlikely to have such information, the
merchant is placed in the advantageous position of knowing the general atti-
tudes and tendencies of the arbitrator.50
42. Commission of the European Communities, supra note 19, at 18.
43. Id.
44. Council Directive 93/13, art 3, annex l(q), 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29, 31, 34 (EC).
45. Id.
46. Martin Odams de Zylva, Effective Means of Resolving Distance Selling Dis-
putes, 67 ARB. 230, 236 (2001).
47. See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Going Private: Technology, Due Process, and
Internet Dispute Resolution, 34 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 151, 210-11 (2000).




SMU Science and Technology Law Review
The disparity of bargaining power quite often allows sellers to unilater-
ally specify the terms of the sale, including dispute settlement clauses, and
offer them to consumers on a take-it-or- leave-it basis.5l In fact, most arbitra-
tion clauses are formed prior to any dispute and are in a standard form. When
consumers form contracts with merchants, they are unlikely to be focused on
the possibility of a future dispute and, therefore, unlikely to notice the exis-
tence of an arbitration clause. In contrast, when consumers form post-dispute
arbitration agreements, they are likely to be focused on the dispute and nego-
tiate a fair dispute resolution clause. It is difficult to perceive pre-dispute
arbitration clauses as fair, particularly when the parties do not have equal
bargaining power, equal experience in arbitration, equal ability to understand
the consequences of contract language (particularly the ramifications of the
rights being waived), or an equal ability to insist that clauses be included or
excluded in the contract.
In the online world, it is crucial that e-commerce and OADR solutions
are not promoted at the expense of consumer protection standards because
consumer protection, which generates consumer confidence, is critical for the
continued growth of e-commerce and OADR. Article 1 (Sphere of Applica-
tion) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce provides:
"This law does not override any rule of law intended for the protection of
consumers."52 The OECD Guidelines, for consumer protection in the context
of electronic commerce, adopt a similar viewpoint: "Consumers who partici-
pate in electronic commerce should be afforded transparent and effective
consumer protection that is not less than the level or protection afforded in
other forms of commerce." 3
Henry Perritt, a leading author on OADR, has argued that online con-
sumers, as a result of the Internet, are more powerful than offline consum-
ers. 54 This is due to the fact that the Internet intensifies competition because
it "[offers] consumers a [wider] array of products and services from different
sellers than they would have in geographically defined markets."55 Robert
Bordone, another leading author on OADR, has responded to Perritt's argu-
51. Henry H. Perritt, Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand for New Forms of
ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 675, 698 (2000).
52. Article 1 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide
to Enactment (1996), http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/elec-
troniccommerce/1996Model.htnl (last visited Oct. 1, 2007).
53. COMMIrrTEE ON CONSUMER POLICY, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERA-
TION AND DEVELOPMENT, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE MARKETPLACE
(1998), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/13/34023235.pdf (last visited May
23, 2008).
54. See Perritt, supra note 47, at 699.
55. Id.
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ment by saying that it is paradoxical.56 Electronic consumers are not always
aware of the law and culture applicable in cyberspace, and they are often not
represented due to the low monetary value of electronic disputes in general.57
By contrast, electronic merchants have the greatest experience with the law
and culture applicable in cyberspace and are likely to obtain the finest
representation.58
Elizabeth Thornburg, another leading author on OADR, agreed with
Bordone in his argument. She argued that the disparity of bargaining power
between consumers and merchants occurs quite often in the online environ-
ment, where the contract is usually in take-it-or-leave-it standardized form.59
According to Thomburg, in order to view the contract, the Internet user must
click on the "terms and conditions" button, and only after he or she has
agreed on such terms and conditions, including those of dispute resolution,
will the online transaction continue.60 Because of the electronic format, an
Internet user cannot cross out terms and bargain for different terms. In such
cases, it might be difficult to prove the consent of the parties, because con-
sent depends on the existence of choice, and if the choice is absent, the pur-
ported consent cannot be said to be voluntary.61
Obviously, contracts that come as part of a standard form that are not
subject to bargaining are called contracts of adhesion. Evidently, determining
the voluntary nature of consent is the centerpiece of debates over contracts of
adhesion.62 As a result, mandatory OADR clauses could be seen as imposed
through contracts of adhesion, where actual consent by definition is absent.
63
V1. CONCLUSION
Without doubt, the issue of consent should be at the forefront of any
contemplated OADR solution. Clearly, it is unacceptable to impose
mandatory OADR on Internet users without their knowledge and consent.
Instead, a complainant who wishes to avoid the mandatory nature of OADR
proceeding must be able to bring the action in any court that has a jurisdic-
tion over the dispute. Bearing this in mind, there is a strong reason to believe
that mandatory OADR schemes would not be enforceable in courts, and that
56. See, e.g., Robert C. Bordone, Electronic Online Dispute Resolution: Approach,
Potential, Problems and a Proposal, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 175 (1998).
57. Id. at 203.
58. Id.
59. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Going Private: Technology, Due Process, and In-
ternet Dispute Resolution, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 151, 153 (2000).
60. Id. (referring to these agreements as "shrinkwrap or "clickwrap").
61. Id at 175-83.
62. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARv. L. REv. 1173, 1180 (1984).
63. Id. at 1180.
2007]
132 SMU Science and Technology Law Review [Vol. XI
the entire scheme of mandatory OADR might be unworkable. Indeed, the
idea of OADR is not simply about the use of technology to resolve disputes
in cyberspace; rather, it is about improving choice among other alternatives.
